What is a declining superpower to do in the face of widespread defiance?
May 28, 2015
Take a look around the world and it’s hard not to conclude
that the United States is a superpower in decline. Whether in Europe,
Asia, or the Middle East, aspiring powers are flexing their muscles,
ignoring Washington’s dictates, or actively combating them. Russia
refuses to curtail its support for armed separatists in Ukraine; China
refuses to abandon its base-building endeavors in the South China Sea; Saudi Arabia
refuses to endorse the U.S.-brokered nuclear deal with Iran; the Islamic State movement (ISIS)
refuses to capitulate in the face of U.S. airpower. What is a declining superpower supposed to do in the face of such defiance?
This
is no small matter. For decades, being a superpower has been the
defining characteristic of American identity. The embrace of global
supremacy began after World War II when the United States assumed
responsibility for resisting Soviet expansionism around the world; it
persisted through the Cold War era and only grew after the implosion of
the Soviet Union, when the U.S. assumed sole responsibility for
combating a whole new array of international threats. As General Colin
Powell
famously exclaimed
in the final days of the Soviet era, “We have to put a shingle outside
our door saying, ‘Superpower Lives Here,’ no matter what the Soviets do,
even if they evacuate from Eastern Europe.”
Imperial Overstretch Hits Washington
Strategically,
in the Cold War years, Washington’s power brokers assumed that there
would always be two superpowers perpetually battling for world
dominance. In the wake of the utterly unexpected Soviet collapse,
American strategists began to envision a world of just one, of a “sole
superpower” (aka
Rome on the Potomac). In line with this new outlook, the administration of George H.W. Bush soon
adopted
a long-range plan intended to preserve that status indefinitely. Known
as the Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-99, it
declared:
“Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival,
either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that
poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union.”
H.W.’s
son, then the governor of Texas, articulated a similar vision of a
globally encompassing Pax Americana when campaigning for president in
1999. If elected, he
told
military cadets at the Citadel in Charleston, his top goal would be “to
take advantage of a tremendous opportunity -- given few nations in
history -- to extend the current peace into the far realm of the future.
A chance to project America’s peaceful influence not just across the
world, but across the years.”
For Bush, of course,
“extending the peace” would turn out to mean invading Iraq and igniting a
devastating regional conflagration that only continues to grow and
spread to this day. Even after it began, he did not doubt -- nor
(despite the reputed wisdom offered by hindsight)
does he today -- that this was the price that had to be paid for the U.S. to retain its vaunted status as the world’s sole superpower.
The
problem, as many mainstream observers now acknowledge, is that such a
strategy aimed at perpetuating U.S. global supremacy at all costs was
always destined to result in what Yale historian Paul Kennedy, in his
classic book
The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,
unforgettably termed “imperial overstretch.” As he presciently wrote in
that 1987 study, it would arise from a situation in which “the sum
total of the United States’ global interests and obligations is… far
larger than the country’s power to defend all of them simultaneously.”
Indeed,
Washington finds itself in exactly that dilemma today. What’s curious,
however, is just how quickly such overstretch engulfed a country that,
barely a decade ago, was being hailed as the planet’s first “
hyperpower,”
a status even more exalted than superpower. But that was before George
W.’s miscalculation in Iraq and other missteps left the U.S. to face a
war-ravaged Middle East with an exhausted military and a depleted
treasury. At the same time, major and regional powers like China, India,
Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have been building up their
economic and military capabilities and, recognizing the weakness that
accompanies imperial overstretch, are beginning to
challenge
U.S. dominance in many areas of the globe. The Obama administration has
been trying, in one fashion or another, to respond in all of those
areas -- among them Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and the South China Sea
-- but without, it turns out, the capacity to prevail in any of them.
Nonetheless,
despite a range of setbacks, no one in Washington’s power elite --
Senators Rand Paul and Bernie Sanders being the exceptions that prove
the rule -- seems to have the slightest urge to abandon the role of sole
superpower or even to back off it in any significant way. President
Obama, who is clearly
all too aware
of the country’s strategic limitations, has been typical in his
unwillingness to retreat from such a supremacist vision. “The United
States is and remains the one indispensable nation,” he
told graduating
cadets at West Point in May 2014. “That has been true for the century
past and it will be true for the century to come.”
How, then, to reconcile the reality of superpower overreach and decline with an unbending commitment to global supremacy?
The
first of two approaches to this conundrum in Washington might be
thought of as a high-wire circus act. It involves the constant juggling
of America’s capabilities and commitments, with its limited resources
(largely of a military nature) being rushed relatively fruitlessly from
one place to another in response to unfolding crises, even as attempts
are made to avoid yet more and deeper entanglements. This, in practice,
has been the strategy pursued by the current administration. Call it
the
Obama Doctrine.
After
concluding, for instance, that China had taken advantage of U.S.
entanglement in Iraq and Afghanistan to advance its own strategic
interests in Southeast Asia, Obama and his top advisers
decided
to downgrade the U.S. presence in the Middle East and free up resources
for a more robust one in the western Pacific. Announcing this shift in
2011 -- it would first be called a “pivot to Asia” and then a
“rebalancing” there -- the president made no secret of the juggling act
involved.
“After a decade in which we fought two wars
that cost us dearly, in blood and treasure, the United States is turning
our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region,” he
told
members of the Australian Parliament that November. “As we end today’s
wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence
and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority. As a result, reductions
in U.S. defense spending will not -- I repeat, will not -- come at the
expense of the Asia Pacific.”
Then,
of course, the new Islamic State launched its offensive in Iraq in June
2014 and the American-trained army there collapsed with the loss of
four northern cities.
Videoed beheadings of American hostages followed, along with a looming
threat to the U.S.-backed regime in Baghdad. Once again, President Obama
found himself pivoting -- this time
sending thousands of U.S. military advisers back to that country,
putting American air power into its skies, and laying the groundwork for another major conflict there.
Meanwhile, Republican critics of the president, who
claim he’s doing too little in a losing effort in Iraq (and Syria), have also taken him to task for
not doing enough
to implement the pivot to Asia. In reality, as his juggling act that
satisfies no one continues in Iraq and the Pacific, he’s had a hard time
finding the wherewithal to effectively confront Vladimir Putin in
Ukraine, Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, the
various militias fighting for power in fragmenting Libya, and so on.
The Party of Utter Denialism
Clearly,
in the face of multiplying threats, juggling has not proven to be a
viable strategy. Sooner or later, the “balls” will simply go flying and
the whole system will threaten to fall apart. But however risky
juggling may prove, it is not nearly as dangerous as the other strategic
response to superpower decline in Washington: utter denial.
For
those who adhere to this outlook, it’s not America’s global stature
that’s eroding, but its will -- that is, its willingness to talk and act
tough. If Washington were simply to speak more loudly, so this argument
goes, and brandish bigger sticks, all these challenges would simply
melt away. Of course, such an approach can only work if you’re prepared
to back up your threats with actual force, or “
hard power,” as some like to call it.
Among the most vocal of those touting this line is
Senator John McCain,
the chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a persistent
critic of President Obama. “For five years, Americans have been told
that ‘the tide of war is receding,’ that we can pull back from the world
at little cost to our interests and values,” he
typically wrote
in March 2014 in a New York Timesop-ed. “This has fed a perception that
the United States is weak, and to people like Mr. Putin, weakness is
provocative.” The only way to prevent aggressive behavior by Russia and
other adversaries, he stated, is “to restore the credibility of the
United States as a world leader.” This means, among other things, arming
the Ukrainians and anti-Assad Syrians, bolstering the NATO presence in
Eastern Europe,
combating “the larger strategic challenge that Iran poses,” and playing a “
more robust” role (think: more “boots” on more ground) in the war against ISIS.
Above
all, of course, it means a willingness to employ military force. “When
aggressive rulers or violent fanatics threaten our ideals, our
interests, our allies, and us,” he
declared last November, “what ultimately makes the difference… is the capability, credibility, and global reach of American hard power.”
A similar approach -- in some cases
even more bellicose
-- is being articulated by the bevy of Republican candidates now in the
race for president, Rand Paul again excepted. At a recent “Freedom
Summit” in the early primary state of South Carolina, the various
contenders sought to out-hard-power each other. Florida Senator Marco
Rubio was
loudly cheered
for promising to make the U.S. “the strongest military power in the
world.” Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker received a standing ovation for
pledging to further escalate the war on international terrorists: “I
want a leader who is willing to take the fight to them before they take
the fight to us.”
In this overheated environment, the
2016 presidential campaign is certain to be dominated by calls for
increased military spending, a tougher stance toward Moscow and Beijing,
and an expanded military presence in the Middle East. Whatever her
personal views, Hillary Clinton, the presumed Democratic candidate, will
be forced to demonstrate her backbone by embracing similar positions.
In other words, whoever enters the Oval Office in January 2017 will be
expected to wield a far bigger stick on a significantly less stable
planet. As a result, despite the last decade and a half of
interventionary disasters, we’re likely to see an even more interventionist foreign policy with an even greater impulse to use military force.
However
initially gratifying such a stance is likely to prove for John McCain
and the growing body of war hawks in Congress, it will undoubtedly prove
disastrous in practice. Anyone who believes that the clock can now be
turned back to 2002, when U.S. strength was at its zenith and the Iraq
invasion had not yet depleted American wealth and vigor, is undoubtedly
suffering from delusional thinking. China is
far more powerful than it was 13 years ago, Russia has
largely recovered from its post-Cold War slump, Iran has
replaced the
U.S. as the dominant foreign actor in Iraq, and other powers have
acquired significantly greater freedom of action in an unsettled world.
Under these circumstances, aggressive muscle-flexing in Washington is
likely to result only in calamity or humiliation.
Time to Stop Pretending
Back, then, to our original question: What is a declining superpower supposed to do in the face of this predicament?
Anywhere
but in Washington, the obvious answer would for it to stop pretending
to be what it’s not. The first step in any 12-step imperial-overstretch
recovery program would involve accepting the fact that American power is
limited and global rule an impossible fantasy. Accepted as well would
have to be this obvious reality: like it or not, the U.S. shares the
planet with a coterie of other major powers -- none as strong as we are,
but none so weak as to be intimidated by the threat of U.S. military
intervention. Having absorbed a more realistic assessment of American
power, Washington would then have to focus on how exactly to cohabit
with such powers -- Russia, China, and Iran among them -- and manage its
differences with them without igniting yet more disastrous regional
firestorms.
If strategic juggling and massive denial
were not so embedded in the political life of this country’s “war
capital,” this would not be an impossibly difficult strategy to pursue,
as others have suggested. In 2010, for example, Christopher Layne of the
George H.W. Bush School at Texas A&M
argued
in the American Conservative that the U.S. could no longer sustain its
global superpower status and, “rather than having this adjustment forced
upon it suddenly by a major crisis… should get ahead of the curve by
shifting its position in a gradual, orderly fashion.” Layne and others
have
spelled out what this might entail: fewer military entanglements abroad, a diminishing urge to
garrison the planet,
reduced military spending, greater reliance on allies, more funds to
use at home in rebuilding the crumbling infrastructure of a divided
society, and a diminished military footprint in the Middle East.
But
for any of this to happen, American policymakers would first have to
abandon the pretense that the United States remains the sole global
superpower -- and that may be too bitter a pill for the present American
psyche (and for the political aspirations of certain Republican
candidates) to swallow. From such denialism, it’s already clear, will
only come further ill-conceived military adventures abroad and, sooner
or later, under far grimmer circumstances, an American reckoning with
reality.
