America may very well be the last empire, because the planet can't sustain any more. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
          
Photo Credit: Shutterstock.com
 
 
 
 
 
May 7, 2013
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It
 stretched from the Caspian to the Baltic Sea, from the middle of Europe
 to the Kurile Islands in the Pacific, from Siberia to Central Asia.  
Its nuclear arsenal held 
45,000 warheads, and its military had 
five million troops
 under arms.  There had been nothing like it in Eurasia since the 
Mongols conquered China, took parts of Central Asia and the Iranian 
plateau, and rode into the Middle East, looting Baghdad.  Yet when the 
Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, by far the poorer, weaker 
imperial power disappeared.
And then there was one.  There had 
never been such a moment: a single nation astride the globe without a 
competitor in sight.  There wasn’t even a name for such a state (or 
state of mind).  “Superpower” had already been used when there were two 
of them.  “Hyperpower” was tried briefly but didn’t stick.  “Sole 
superpower” stood in for a while but didn’t satisfy.  “Great Power,” 
once the zenith of appellations, was by then a lesser phrase, left over 
from the centuries when various European nations and Japan were 
expanding their empires.  Some started speaking about a “unipolar” world
 in which all roads led... well, to Washington.
To this day, we’ve never quite taken in that moment when Soviet imperial rot unexpectedly -- 
above all,
 to Washington -- became imperial crash-and-burn.  Left standing, the 
Cold War's victor seemed, then, like an empire of everything under the 
sun.  It was as if humanity had always been traveling toward this spot. 
 It seemed like the end of the line.
The Last Empire?
After
 the rise and fall of the Assyrians and the Romans, the Persians, the 
Chinese, the Mongols, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the 
French, the English, the Germans, and the Japanese, some process seemed 
over.  The United States was dominant in a previously unimaginable way 
-- except in Hollywood films where villains cackled about their evil 
plans to dominate the world.
As a start, the U.S. was an empire of
 global capital.  With the fall of Soviet-style communism (and the 
transformation of a communist regime in China into a crew of 
authoritarian “capitalist roaders”), there was no other model for how to
 do anything, economically speaking.  There was Washington’s way -- and 
that of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (both 
controlled by Washington) -- or there was the highway, and the Soviet 
Union had already made it all too clear where that led: to obsolescence 
and ruin.
 
In
 addition, the U.S. had unprecedented military power.  By the time the 
Soviet Union began to totter, America's leaders had for nearly a decade 
been consciously using “the arms race” to spend its opponent into an 
early grave.  And here was the curious thing after centuries of arms 
races: when there was no one left to race, the U.S. continued an arms 
race of one.
In the years that followed, it would 
outpace all other countries or combinations of countries in military spending by staggering amounts.  It housed the world’s 
most powerful weapons makers, was technologically light years ahead of any other state, and was continuing to develop 
future weaponry for 2020, 2040, 2060, even as it established a 
near monopoly on the global arms trade (and so, control over who would be well-armed and who wouldn’t).
It had an 
empire of bases abroad, more than 
1,000 of
 them spanning the globe, also an unprecedented phenomenon.  And it was 
culturally dominant, again in a way that made comparisons with other 
moments ludicrous.  Like American weapons makers producing things that 
went boom in the night for an international audience, Hollywood's action
 and fantasy films took the world by storm.  From those movies to the 
golden arches, the swoosh, and the personal computer, there was no other
 culture that could come close to claiming such a global cachet.
The
 key non-U.S. economic powerhouses of the moment -- Europe and Japan -- 
maintained militaries dependent on Washington, had U.S. bases littering 
their territories, and continued to nestle under Washington’s “nuclear 
umbrella.”  No wonder that, in the U.S., the post-Soviet moment was soon
 proclaimed “
the end of history,”
 and the victory of “liberal democracy” or “freedom” was celebrated as 
if there really were no tomorrow, except more of what today had to 
offer.
No wonder that, in the new century, neocons and 
supporting pundits would
 begin to claim that the British and Roman empires had been 
second-raters by comparison.  No wonder that key figures in and around 
the George W. Bush administration 
dreamed of
 establishing a Pax Americana in the Greater Middle East and possibly 
over the globe itself (as well as a Pax Republicana at home).  They 
imagined that they might 
actually prevent another competitor or bloc of competitors from arising to challenge American power. Ever.
No
 wonder they had remarkably few hesitations about launching their 
incomparably powerful military on wars of choice in the Greater Middle 
East.  What could possibly go wrong?  What could stand in the way of the
 greatest power history had ever seen?
Assessing the Imperial Moment, Twenty-First-Century-Style
Almost
 a quarter of a century after the Soviet Union disappeared, what’s 
remarkable is how much -- and how little -- has changed.
On the 
how-much front: Washington’s dreams of military glory ran aground with 
remarkable speed in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Then, in 2007, the 
transcendent empire of capital came close to imploding as well, as a 
unipolar financial disaster spread across the planet.  It led people to 
begin to wonder whether the globe’s greatest power might not, in fact, 
be too big to fail, and we were suddenly -- so everyone said -- plunged 
into a “multipolar world.”
Meanwhile, the Greater Middle East 
descended into protest, rebellion, civil war, and chaos without a Pax 
Americana in sight, as a Washington-controlled Cold War system in the 
region shuddered without (yet) collapsing.  The ability of Washington to
 impose its will on the planet looked ever more like the wildest of 
fantasies, while every sign, including the 
hemorrhaging of national treasure into losing 
trillion-dollar wars, reflected not ascendancy but possible decline.
And
 yet, in the how-little category: the Europeans and Japanese remained 
nestled under that American “umbrella,” their territories still filled 
with U.S. bases.  In the Euro Zone, governments 
continued to cut back on
 their investments in both NATO and their own militaries.  Russia 
remained a country with a sizeable nuclear arsenal and a reduced but 
still large military.  Yet it showed no signs of “superpower” 
pretensions.  Other regional powers 
challenged unipolarity economically
 -- Turkey and Brazil, to name two -- but not militarily, and none 
showed an urge either singly or in blocs to compete in an imperial sense
 with the U.S.
Washington’s enemies in the world remained 
remarkably modest-sized (though
 blown to enormous proportions in the American media echo-chamber).  
They included a couple of rickety regional powers (Iran and North 
Korea), a minority insurgency or two, and relatively small groups of 
Islamist “terrorists.”  Otherwise, as one gauge of power on the planet, 
no more than a 
handful of other countries had even a 
handful of military bases outside their territory.
Under
 the circumstances, nothing could have been stranger than this: in its 
moment of total ascendancy, the Earth’s sole superpower with a military 
of staggering destructive potential and technological sophistication 
couldn’t win a war against minimally armed guerillas.  Even more 
strikingly, despite having no serious opponents anywhere, it seemed not 
on the rise but on the decline, its infrastructure 
rotting out, its populace economically depressed, its wealth 
ever more unequally divided, its Congress seemingly beyond repair, while the great sucking sound that could be heard was money and power 
heading toward the national security state.  Sooner or later, all empires fall, but this moment was proving curious indeed.
And
 then, of course, there was China.  On the planet that humanity has 
inhabited these last several thousand years, can there be any question 
that China would have been the obvious pick to challenge, sooner or 
later, the dominion of the reigning great power of the moment?  
Estimates are that it will 
surpass the U.S. as the globe’s number one economy by perhaps 2030.
Right now, the Obama administration seems to be working on just that assumption.  With its well-publicized 
“pivot” (or
 “rebalancing”) to Asia, it has been moving to “contain” what it fears 
might be the next great power.  However, while the Chinese are indeed 
expanding their military and 
challenging their
 neighbors in the waters of the Pacific, there is no sign that the 
country’s leadership is ready to embark on anything like a global 
challenge to the U.S., nor that it could do so in any conceivable 
future.  Its domestic problems, from 
pollution to 
unrest, remain staggering enough that it’s hard to imagine a China not absorbed with domestic issues through 2030 and beyond.
And Then There Was One (Planet)
Militarily,
 culturally, and even to some extent economically, the U.S. remains 
surprisingly alone on planet Earth in imperial terms, even if little has
 worked out as planned in Washington.  The story of the years since the 
Soviet Union fell may prove to be a tale of how American domination and 
decline went hand-in-hand, with the decline part of the equation being 
strikingly self-generated.
And yet here’s a genuine, even 
confounding, possibility: that moment of “unipolarity” in the 1990s may 
really have been the end point of history as human beings had known it 
for millennia -- the history, that is, of the rise and fall of empires. 
 Could the United States actually be the last empire?  Is it possible 
that there will be no successor because something has profoundly changed
 in the realm of empire building?  One thing is increasingly clear: 
whatever the state of imperial America, something significantly more 
crucial to the fate of humanity (and of empires) is in decline.  I’m 
talking, of course, about the planet itself.
The present 
capitalist model (the only one available) for a rising power, whether 
China, India, or Brazil, is also a model for planetary decline, possibly
 of a precipitous nature.  The very definition of success -- more 
middle-class consumers, more car owners, more shoppers, which means more
 energy used, more fossil fuels burned, more greenhouse gases entering 
the atmosphere -- is also, as it never would have been before, the 
definition of failure.  The greater the “success,” the more intense 
the droughts, the stronger the storms, the more 
extreme the
weather, the higher the rise in 
sea levels, the 
hotter the temperatures, the greater 
the chaos in
 low-lying or tropical lands, the more profound the failure.  The 
question is: Will this put an end to the previous patterns of history, 
including the until-now-predictable rise of the next great power, the 
next empire?  On a devolving planet, is it even possible to imagine the 
next stage in imperial gigantism?
Every factor that would normally
 lead toward “greatness” now also leads toward global decline.  This 
process -- which couldn’t be more unfair to countries having their 
industrial and consumer revolutions late -- gives a new meaning to the 
phrase “
disaster capitalism.”
Take
 the Chinese, whose leaders, on leaving the Maoist model behind, did the
 most natural thing in the world at the time: they patterned their 
future economy on the United States -- on, that is, success as it was 
then defined.  Despite both traditional and revolutionary communal 
traditions, for instance, they decided that to be a power in the world, 
you needed to make the car (which meant the individual driver) a pillar 
of any future state-capitalist China.  If it worked for the U.S., it 
would work for them, and in the short run, it worked like a dream, a 
capitalist miracle -- and China rose.
It was, however, also a formula for 
massive pollution, environmental degradation, and the pouring of ever more fossil fuels into the atmosphere in 
record amounts. 
 And it's not just China.  It doesn’t matter whether you’re talking 
about that country's ravenous energy use, including its possible future “
carbon bombs,” or the potential for American decline to be halted by new extreme methods of producing energy (
fracking, 
tar-sands extraction, deep-water drilling).  Such methods, however much they hurt local environments, might indeed 
turn the U.S. into a “
new Saudi Arabia.”  Yet that, in turn, would only contribute further to the degradation of the planet, to decline on an ever-larger scale.
What
 if, in the twenty-first century, going up means declining?  What if the
 unipolar moment turns out to be a planetary moment in which previously 
distinct imperial events -- the rise and fall of empires -- fuse into a 
single disastrous system?
What if the story of our times is this: And then there was one planet, and it was going down.
Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the 
American Empire Project and author of 
The United States of Fear as well as a history of the Cold War, 
The End of Victory Culture, runs the Nation Institute's 
TomDispatch.com. His latest book, co-authored with Nick Turse, is 
Terminator Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050.
Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on 
Facebook or 
Tumblr. Check out the newest Dispatch book, Nick Turse’s 
The Changing Face of Empire: Special Ops, Drones, Proxy Fighters, Secret Bases, and Cyberwarfare.
Copyright 2013 Tom Engelhardt
 
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